In the newest episode of Israeli assaults on Iran, on Monday, 16 June 2025, Israeli forces struck the headquarters of the Iranian state broadcaster in Tehran. In a publish on X, the Israeli Defence Minister instantly claimed accountability, stating
‘The propaganda and incitement broadcasting authority of the Iranian regime was attacked by the IDF […]. We are going to defeat the Iranian dictator all over the place.’
This assertion implies that the broadcasting studio was thought-about a professional goal. Whereas this would possibly align with Clausewitz’s view that the enemy’s morale is a professional navy goal, it raises the query of whether or not such an interpretation is legitimate underneath trendy worldwide regulation. Briefly, it’s not – not less than not except the studio is deemed to pose an imminent navy menace or is meant for navy use, or is immediately inciting severe crimes underneath worldwide regulation.
The Safety of Journalists underneath Worldwide Humanitarian Regulation
Probably the most related laws on the safety of individuals in armed battle are discovered within the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Extra Protocols. As a part of worldwide humanitarian regulation, their applicability begins as quickly as an armed battle exists. No matter one’s view on the legality of the usage of power ab initio, it’s evident that Israel and Iran are at present concerned in a global armed battle. This publish is predicated on this premise.
Of the 4 Geneva Conventions of 1949 solely Article 4(A)(4) of the Third Geneva Conference relative to the Remedy of Prisoners of Warfare addresses media personnel. This text extends the protections afforded to prisoners of struggle within the case of seize to struggle correspondents accompanying armed forces. Given the restricted safety for journalists vis-à-vis their very important societal function in reporting on armed conflicts, the UN Normal Meeting in 1970 handed a decision calling for enhanced safety of journalists underneath IHL. This led to the adoption of a draft Worldwide Conference on the Safety of Journalists Engaged in Harmful Missions by the UN Financial and Social Committee – although it was by no means ratified. Nonetheless, it influenced the inclusion of such provision in Article 79 of the Extra Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I), which supplies that journalists have to be thought-about civilians and, as such, are entitled to full safety. The content material of this provision was reaffirmed by UN Safety Council Decision 1783 and is now considered customary worldwide regulation.
The Scope of Safety Awarded
Article 79 of AP I doesn’t outline the time period ‘journalist’. Nevertheless, Article 2(a) of the aforementioned draft conference helps make clear this, defining a journalist as any ‘correspondent, reporter, photographer, movie cameraman or press technician who has that standing by advantage of their nation’s regulation or follow.’ This yields a broad definition. Moreover, Article 79 of AP I requires that journalists be engaged in a ‘harmful skilled mission within the space of armed battle’ – a time period that covers typical journalistic actions carried out in an space affected by hostilities: conducting interviews, recording, or transmitting supplies to the general public.
If these situations are met, journalists take pleasure in the identical safety as civilians underneath Article 50 of AP I. They need to not be indiscriminately focused, and all possible measures have to be taken to make sure their security. This stays true, even when a journalist is embedded with the armed forces, accompanies armed forces or takes benefit of their logistic help. Beneath Article 52 of AP I, this safety additionally extends to gear utilized by journalists, offered these are thought-about civilian in nature. In case of doubt, the presumption of Article 52(3) of AP I applies. Thus, the safety covers cameras, broadcasting gear, in addition to broadcasting amenities.
Exemptions to the Rule
Israel’s characterisation of the Iranian broadcaster as a ‘propaganda and incitement machine’ raises the authorized query of when such amenities might lawfully be focused for disseminating propagandist materials. And certainly, a limitation arises when Article 79(1) of AP I is learn together with Article 51(3) of AP I: if a civilian – extra particularly, a journalist – takes a direct half in hostilities, their safety ceases. An identical studying applies to journalists’ gear underneath Article 52(2) of AP I, the place safety ends if the item is used for navy functions.
It should thus be assessed when a journalist’s actions represent ‘direct participation’ in hostilities or whether or not media amenities are getting used for navy aims – and particularly, whether or not propagandistic actions meet this threshold. The definition of navy aims in Article 52(2) requires that the item, by its nature, location, objective, or use, makes an efficient contribution to navy motion and that its destruction presents a particular navy benefit. This excessive commonplace isn’t met by media amenities. Conceivable circumstances embrace dual-use eventualities, reminiscent of utilizing TV transmitters for navy communications or repurposing the constructing as navy command publish.
In evaluating propagandistic materials, the ICTY’s Closing Report back to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Overview the NATO Bombing Marketing campaign In opposition to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presents steering. In contemplating the legality of NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavian TV stations, the report said that whether or not media constitutes a professional goal is debatable and concluded that disseminating propaganda to help a struggle effort isn’t ample by itself. Nevertheless, the report left open the chance that if media kinds the ‘central nervous system’ sustaining a regime and perpetuating battle, it is likely to be thought-about a professional navy goal. Nonetheless, the ICTY in the end reaffirmed the overarching authorized commonplace of AP I for assaults on civilians and civilian objects, particularly that an assault should successfully contribute to navy operations and supply a particular navy benefit. Whereas propagandistic messages can bolster civilian morale, they normally fail to satisfy this criterion – a conclusion that runs counter to Clausewitz’s assertion. Due to this fact, this exception can nearly underneath all circumstances be thought-about factually irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the ICTY famous one ultimate exception, impartial of navy aims: when the media explicitly incites the fee of significant crimes underneath worldwide regulation. Particularly, it cited the usage of the media through the Rwandan genocide of 1994 for instance, referring to the Rwandan Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), which performed a elementary function in inciting the violence that in the end led to the genocide. Nevertheless, that is an excessive and exceptionally slim situation. Propagandistic content material alone doesn’t meet this commonplace.
Conclusion
Thus, the safety afforded to journalists and media broadcasters underneath IHL is powerful, and any exceptions to this safety have to be interpreted strictly. In opposition to this backdrop, the Israeli Defence Minister’s justification doesn’t stand as much as authorized scrutiny. In comparison with RTLM through the Rwandan genocide, which explicitly incited mass violence and genocide, the Iranian broadcaster’s output, nevertheless antisemitic and hostile it might be, doesn’t meet the authorized threshold for lack of safety from this attitude.
Until Israel can show that the broadcaster was additionally used for navy functions the strike have to be thought-about incompatible with IHL. Merely labelling a media outlet as a propagandist arm of the state doesn’t render it a lawful navy goal.
