João Pedro Sousa (grasp’s scholar in European Union Legislation on the Faculty of Legislation of the College of Minho)
1. Preliminary issues
Judicial independence is a basic pillar of the rule of regulation enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It ensures that judges are free from exterior pressures – whether or not from the manager, legislative branches, or non-public pursuits –, permitting them to adjudicate instances impartially and pretty. Within the European Union (EU) context, judicial independence transcends the interior affairs of Member States; it’s a vital safeguard to make sure the total utility of EU regulation and efficient judicial safety. The Court docket of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has persistently emphasised that nationwide courts act as “European courts”,[1] making use of and upholding EU regulation inside their jurisdictions. Consequently, any impairment to the judicial independence in a Member State poses a nationwide constitutional problem and a direct risk to the European authorized order.[2]
The current joined instances C-146/23 (Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku) and C-374/23[3] (Adoreikė) come at a pivotal second as considerations over the rule of regulation rise in sure Member States. These joined instances addressed whether or not budgetary measures impacting the remuneration of judges in Poland and Lithuania, launched by way of nationwide laws, violated EU regulation by undermining judicial independence. Their significance is heightened by the truth that they coincide with the seventh anniversary of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment [Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas (ASJP)],[4] a landmark case that firmly established judicial independence as a basic aspect of the rule of regulation underneath EU regulation. As highlighted in a current evaluation on this weblog, understanding the legacy of the “Portuguese Judges” judgment is important to contextualising the challenges dealing with the judiciary at present.[5]
Consistent with the evolution of its case regulation, the CJEU’s judgment within the joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirmed that whereas Member States retain discretion over the organisation of their judicial programs, that is bounded by the Union’s basic values together with efficient judicial safety underneath Article 19(1) second subparagraph TEU, as a result of the Member States are required to adjust to their obligations deriving from EU regulation. To that extent the “Portuguese Judges” judgment demonstrated that budgetary constraints might justify sure changes to the remuneration of judges if they’re non permanent, proportionate, and a part of public-sector expenditure measures.[6] Nonetheless, the important thing problem in C-146/23 and C-374/23 is whether or not such measures, regardless of being non permanent and linked to socio-economic context, will be thought to be impartial public-sector insurance policies or in the event that they expose a extra delicate type of political interference masked as fiscal restraint.
This article will critically look at the authorized penalties of the joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23, discover how they construct upon the “Portuguese Judges” case, and additional outline the boundaries between legit nationwide discretion and illegal interference on judicial independence. Finally, it can tackle a central problem: to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified with out crossing the road into violations of the rule of regulation underneath EU regulation?
2. Authorized and factual context
The joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23 arose from authorized challenges introduced by judges in Poland and Lithuania regarding the remuneration of judges. The central problem in each instances revolves across the interpretation of Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU, in addition to Article 47 of the Constitution of Elementary Rights of the European Union (CFREU) – on the proper to an efficient judicial treatment, which should be duly considered for the needs of deciphering the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU (paras. 1 and 43) – within the context of nationwide measures affecting judges’ remuneration and judicial independence.
In C-146/23, the dispute involved the Polish decide XL, who contested the tactic used to calculate his remuneration. Below Article 91(1c) of the Polish Legislation on the Organisation of Bizarre Courts, judges’ remuneration was historically tied to the common wage for the second quarter of the previous 12 months. Nonetheless, this mechanism was amended 3 times: for 2021, the calculation referred to 2019 salaries (as a substitute of 2020); for 2022, the 2020 determine was used, with a minimal enhance of 26 Polish zlotys (roughly EUR 6); and in 2023, the remuneration was dissociated from the statistical calculation, relying as a substitute on a primary quantity set by the Polish legislature. The Polish Authorities justified these derogations by invoking the financial state of affairs attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, the struggle in Ukraine, and the ensuing rise in power costs (paras. 10-21). The referring Polish court docket expressed considerations that the sustained freezing of judges’ salaries for 3 years and the abandonment in 2023 of the mechanism for figuring out their remuneration based mostly on the common wage of the second quarter of the previous 12 months undermine the proper of judges to obtain remuneration decided by goal standards, unbiased of arbitrary choices by the legislature, and in line with the dignity of their workplace. It additionally famous that whereas the freezing of salaries was initially supposed to be non permanent, its extension for 2023 demonstrates the intention to completely scale back judges’ remuneration. Moreover, the referring Polish court docket argued that any intervention within the functioning and organisation of the judiciary ought to solely happen exceptionally and outcome from concerted motion by each the legislature and the judiciary to keep away from arbitrary interference by the manager and legislature, which undermines judicial independence (paras. 17-19).
In C-374/23, Lithuanian judges SR and RB equally challenged the discretion afforded to the legislature and government in figuring out their remuneration. Their salaries, calculated underneath the Legislation on the Remuneration of Judges (2008), had been based mostly on a base charge set yearly by the Lithuanian Parliament on the Authorities’s proposal. This charge couldn’t be decrease than the earlier 12 months’s however was adjusted in accordance with financial elements resembling inflation charges, the minimal month-to-month wage, and the affect of different elements affecting the extent and evolution of the common wage within the public sector (para. 7). The Republic of Lithuania contends that planning of the State finances and, specifically, of the speed of remuneration of public officers falls inside the constitutional prerogatives of the Authorities. As well as, the bottom charge of remuneration is ready yearly in accordance with the sources and monetary constraints of the State, which means it couldn’t be elevated extra quickly (para. 24). The referring court docket states that the remuneration of the judges of the Regional Courts is calculated by multiplying the bottom charge, which was EUR 181 in 2022 and EUR 186 in 2023, by a wage coefficient that has remained unchanged since 1 October 2013, apart from the judges of the District Courts (para. 25). The judges argued that this technique lacked steady and unbiased standards, asserting that the willpower of their remuneration was topic to the political will of the manager and the legislature, thereby failing to look at, inter alia, the constitutional precept of judicial independence (paras. 22–23). The referring Lithuanian court docket questioned whether or not a nationwide system for the remuneration of judges, which is immediately depending on the political will of the legislature and the manager, is in line with EU regulation, notably with the values protected by Article 2 TEU and Article 47 CFREU, thus elevating considerations about its compatibility with the assure judicial independence and the proper to an efficient treatment (paras. 29–30).
These instances had been constructed immediately on the inspiration laid within the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. In that case, the CJEU accepted non permanent and proportionate remuneration reductions for Portuguese judges as a part of broader austerity measures affecting your entire public sector in the course of the monetary disaster. The query within the joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23 was whether or not the Polish and Lithuanian measures could possibly be equally justified or in the event that they crossed the road into impermissible interference with judicial independence (paras. 65-76).
3. Findings of the Court docket
The CJEU, sitting because the Grand Chamber, reaffirmed the elemental precept that judicial independence is important to making sure the total utility of EU regulation and the judicial safety that people derive from EU regulation (para. 47). The Court docket’s judgment rested on a meticulous interpretation of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, learn along side Article 47 of the CFREU, reinforcing the concept nationwide courts are additionally European courts tasked with guaranteeing the total utility of EU regulation (paras. 46–48). The Court docket drew a transparent distinction between legit nationwide discretion in organising judicial programs, together with setting judges’ remuneration, and actions that violate EU regulation by compromising judicial independence.
The CJEU emphasised that whereas Member States retain the authority to organise their judicial programs, this discretion is just not absolute. It should function inside the boundaries set by EU regulation, notably the duty to safeguard judicial independence. The Court docket emphasised that judicial independence is just not merely a proper idea however a substantive assure that requires judges to be free from exterior pressures, whether or not direct or oblique. This freedom consists of the receipt of a degree of remuneration commensurate with the significance of judicial capabilities, because it constitutes a safeguard in opposition to undue affect and a key aspect in guaranteeing impartiality, as beforehand said within the “Portuguese judges” judgment (para. 49).
The CJEU reaffirmed that any mechanism for figuring out judges’ remuneration should be goal, foreseeable, steady, and clear (para. 56). It additionally addressed the circumstances underneath which Member States might undertake budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration. Whereas acknowledging that Member States might, in distinctive instances, impose such measures, the Court docket set strict circumstances for his or her legitimacy (paras. 65-76). These measures should pursue an goal of normal curiosity, resembling eliminating an extreme authorities deficit, as recognised within the “Portuguese Judges” judgment. Nonetheless, the Court docket was cautious to focus on that these measures should not particularly goal the judiciary; reasonably, they need to kind a part of broader reforms affecting the general public sector as an entire. Moreover, any budgetary restriction should be non permanent and proportionate to the purpose pursued, guaranteeing that judges’ monetary safety is just not unduly compromised (paras. 67, 69, 73).
In assessing the Polish and Lithuanian measures on the coronary heart of the joined instances, the Court docket scrutinised their compatibility with EU regulation, notably the precept of judicial independence:
i) Concerning Poland, the Court docket acknowledged the Polish Authorities’s justification for the remuneration measures relevant in 2022 and 2023, which derogated from Article 91(1c) of the Legislation on the Organisation of the Bizarre Courts. These derogations had been offered as responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Federation’s aggression in opposition to Ukraine, and the ensuing enhance in power costs (para. 78). The Court docket noticed that the contested measures, set out on Article 8 of the Legislation accompanying the finances for 2022 and Article 8 of the Legislation accompanying the finances for 2023, particularly focused the remuneration of judges and prosecutors, which prima facie, might undermine the precept of judicial independence (para. 79). Nonetheless, having regard to the issues set out in paragraphs 69 and 70 and the Polish Authorities proof, the Court docket didn’t mechanically conclude that these measures breached EU regulation. As an alternative, it instructed the referring court docket to establish whether or not these measures, whereas particularly aimed toward judges, fashioned a part of broader budgetary restrictions that additionally affected different classes of officers or public servants. In accordance with the Polish Authorities proof, these measures might search to use, on a deferred foundation, to judges budgetary restrictions that had already been imposed on different public sector staff in earlier years (para. 79). Moreover, the Court docket famous that, topic to verification by the referring court docket, the contested remuneration measures every utilized for just one 12 months. It noticed that these measures seemed to be distinctive and non permanent, as indicated by the truth that the mechanism for calculating remuneration was not repealed and was reinstated in 2024, as confirmed by the Polish Authorities and the Fee in the course of the listening to earlier than the Court docket (para. 80). Once more topic to verification by the referring court docket, it is usually obvious that the remunerations freezes didn’t appear to cut back judges’ remuneration in absolute phrases; though there was a lack of buying energy, the remunerations had been frozen in 2021 however elevated by 4.37% in 2022 and seven.8% in 2023. When bonuses and exemptions from social safety contributions, amounting to almost 14% of gross remuneration, had been factored in, Polish judges’ remuneration reportedly remained 3 times the nationwide common wage, as said by the Polish Authorities and the Fee (para. 81). One other essential level was the Court docket’s acknowledgement of the supply of efficient judicial evaluation in Poland. The actual fact that the Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku (District Court docket, Białystok) referred the case for a preliminary ruling demonstrated that judges had entry to a judicial treatment to contest the wage measures (para. 82). Accordingly, topic to verification by the referring court docket, there isn’t any indication that Article 8 of the Legislation accompanying the finances for 2022 and Article 8 of the Legislation accompanying the finances for 2023, violated the necessities of judicial independence underneath the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, learn along side Article 2 TEU (para. 83).
ii) Turning to Lithuania, the Court docket examined the system governing judges’ remuneration, which is predicated on a base charge set yearly by the legislature and the manager. This charge is adjusted in accordance with a set of goal standards, together with the annual inflation charge for the previous 12 months, which depends upon the nationwide shopper value index, the extent of the minimal month-to-month wage, and the affect of different elements affecting the extent and evolution of the common wage within the public sector (para. 84). The Court docket acknowledged that, topic to verification by the referring court docket, these guidelines seemed to be goal, foreseeable, steady, and clear, important safeguards for judicial independence (para. 84). Addressing considerations in regards to the adequacy of judges’ remuneration in Lithuania, the Court docket reiterated that the evaluation should contemplate the financial, social, and monetary state of affairs of the MS and evaluate judges’ remuneration with the nationwide common wage (para. 85).[7] The Court docket cited the 2022 report by the European Fee for the effectivity of justice (CEPEJ), which confirmed that in 2020, Lithuanian judges’ common gross wage initially of their profession was 2.1 occasions the nationwide common, rising to 2.9 occasions for judges of the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court docket of Lithuania) (para. 86). The Court docket famous that whereas a 2019 tax reform had resulted in a nominal discount of judges’ remuneration, there was inadequate element within the referring court docket’s order to determine whether or not this undermined judicial independence (para. 87). Consequently, pending verification by the referring court docket, there isn’t any indication that the remuneration guidelines relevant to SR and RB in the course of the related interval violated the precept of judicial independence (para. 88). Lastly, the reference for a preliminary ruling from the Regional Administrative Court docket of Vilnius is enough to reveal the opportunity of efficient judicial evaluation of the contested wage measures (para. 89).
Finally, the Court docket concluded that the precept of judicial independence doesn’t preclude nationwide measures to set or regulate judges’ remuneration, offered such measures meet particular standards. These measures should be lawful, clear, and non-arbitrary, with detailed guidelines which are goal, foreseeable, steady, and proportionate to a legit normal curiosity. The Court docket additional clarified that even derogations from nationwide laws that freeze or scale back the remuneration of judges can adjust to EU regulation, as long as they’re based mostly on regulation, pursue an goal of normal curiosity, and kind a part of broader public sector reforms reasonably than focusing on judges particularly. Crucially, such measures should be distinctive, non permanent, and open to efficient judicial evaluation (para. 90).
In conclusion, the CJEU didn’t discover an automated violation of judicial independence in both the Polish or Lithuanian case. As an alternative, it left the ultimate willpower to the referring courts, instructing them to confirm whether or not the remuneration measures had been distinctive, proportionate, and a part of wider public sector reforms and whether or not judges had entry to efficient judicial treatments. The Court docket’s cautious balancing of nationwide discretion and EU oversight highlights its nuanced method to defending judicial independence, guaranteeing that Member States retain some flexibility in managing budgetary constraints, however by no means on the expense of the elemental values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Concluding observations
Returning to the query raised within the introduction – to what extent can budgetary restriction measures affecting judges’ remuneration be justified with out crossing the road into violations of the rule of regulation underneath EU regulation? – the joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23 offered a transparent however fastidiously balanced framework. The Court docket reaffirmed that whereas budgetary constraints might justify non permanent and proportionate changes to judges’ remuneration, such measures should adhere to strict authorized and procedural safeguards. Critically, any interference should be distinctive, clear, and a part of broader public-sector reforms, guaranteeing that judges stay free from monetary or political pressures.
This judgment accentuates that judicial independence is a basic European worth deeply rooted in Article 2 and Article 19(1) TEU. Neither Article 2 TEU nor the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, nor another provision of EU regulation requires Member States to undertake a selected constitutional mannequin governing the relationships and interplay between the varied branches of the State, specifically as regards the definition and delimitation of their competences. Below Article 4(2) TEU, the EU should respect the nationwide identities of the Member States, inherent of their basic political and constitutional buildings. Nonetheless, in selecting their respective constitutional mannequin, the Member States are required to adjust to their obligations deriving from EU regulation (paras. 45-46).
The Court docket’s agency place makes clear budgetary justifications don’t grant unchecked energy to change judges’ remuneration in ways in which might compromise judicial independence. Any direct or oblique try and exert management over the judiciary will probably be topic to rigorous scrutiny underneath EU regulation. This angle aligns with the evaluation offered by Alessandra Silveira, who has persistently emphasised that an issue associated to judicial independence in a Member State is essentially a European downside, since nationwide courts and the CJEU share duty for guaranteeing the total utility of EU regulation and defending the elemental rights of people throughout the Member States. [8]/[9]/[10]
By strengthening the hyperlink between judicial independence and the total utility of EU regulation, the CJEU has additional consolidated the authorized framework defending the rule of regulation. Judges’ remuneration can’t be manipulated as a device of affect, as doing so dangers violating the rule of regulation, weakening nationwide judicial independence, and jeopardising the EU’s constitutional construction. In conclusion, joined instances C-146/23 and C-374/23 reaffirm the CJEU’s ongoing position as a guardian of the rule of regulation, solidifying judicial independence as a shared European worth, important to preserving democracy, defending basic rights, and guaranteeing the total utility of EU regulation.
[1] This angle was totally developed by Alessandra Silveira in “Tribunais nacionais” in Enciclopédia da União Europeia, ed. Ana Paula Brandão, Francisco Pereira Coutinho, Isabel Camisão, Joana Covelo de Abreu (Braga: Petrony, July 2017), 455-458.
[2] Alessandra Silveira, Joana Abreu, Pedro Froufe, and Sophie Perez, “União de direito para além do direito da União – as garantias de independência judicial no acórdão Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” Julgar, Might 2018. Out there at http://julgar.pt/uniao-de-direito-para-alem-do-direito-da-uniao-as-garantias-de-independencia-judicial-no-acordao-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[3] Judgment CJEU XL and Others v. Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Lietuvos Respublika, 25 February 2025, case C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2025:109.
[4] Judgment CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 27 February 2018, case C-64/16 ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
[5] See Juan Gálvez Galisteo, “7 years of the Portuguese Judges judgment – understanding the place we come from so we all know the place we’re going”, The Official Weblog of UNIO – Considering and Debating Europe, 15 March 2025, https://officialblogofunio.com/2025/03/15/7-years-of-the-portuguese-judges-judgment-understanding-where-we-come-from-so-we-know-where-we-are-going/.
[6] Judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, para. 46.
[7] Consistent with Advocate Basic’s Opinion of 13 June 2024, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku, C-146/23, ECLI:EU:C:2024:507, 49.
[8] See Alessandra Silveira, “Horizontal integration and Union based mostly on the rule of regulation” in Estado de Direito na União Europeia, ed. Anabela Miranda Rodrigues, Jónatas Machado, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque (Coimbra: Instituto Jurídico da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022), 1-12. https://ucpages.uc.pt/web site/property/information/873179/ruleoflaw_cap1.pdf.
[9] Alessandra Silveira and Sophie Perez Fernandes, “A Union Based mostly on the Rule of Legislation Past the Scope of EU Legislation – The Ensures Important to Judicial Independence in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,” The Official Weblog of UNIO – Considering and Debating Europe, 3 April 2018, https://officialblogofunio.com/2018/04/03/a-union-based-on-the-rule-of-law-beyond-the-scope-of-eu-law-the-guarantees-essential-to-judicial-independence-in-associacao-sindical-dos-juizes-portugueses/.
[10] Alessandra Silveira and Joana Abreu, “Evaluate of Portuguese Affiliation of European Legislation’s webinar on the rule of regulation safety within the European Union”, The Official Weblog of UNIO – Considering and Debating Europe, 14 June 2021, https://officialblogofunio.com/2021/06/14/review-of-portuguese-association-of-european-laws-webinar-on-the-rule-of-law-protection-in-the-european-union.
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