The defence spending of EU member states has elevated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kamil Zwolski argues this further spending should now be accompanied by a coherent long-term safety technique.
The total-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 essentially destroyed Europe’s post-Chilly Warfare safety assumptions, particularly amongst these states that didn’t draw the proper conclusions in 2014, following Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine.
Three years into the battle, Europe faces a paradox. On the one hand, Europe unequivocally dedicated to serving to Ukraine defend itself and embraced Ukraine as a future EU member. Then again, Europe’s reactive strategy and the half-hearted dedication of nations like Germany threat perpetuating a cycle of escalation with out a credible imaginative and prescient of the settlement.
Notably, defence spending throughout EU member states has elevated by over 30% since 2021 and initiatives such because the €800 billion ReArm Europe Plan convey the message that the continent is now severe about deterrence and that pressing measures are being adopted at each the EU and nationwide ranges.
The issue for the EU, nonetheless, is similar because it has ever been: bold monetary commitments can’t substitute for strategic readability. Europe’s credibility as a safety actor relies upon not solely on the scale of its armies but in addition on with the ability to transfer past the crisis-driven response and formulate a coherent long-term technique that balances army resilience with pragmatic diplomacy. Creating a method, nonetheless, is simpler stated than carried out, contemplating the onerous selections that lie forward.
The boundaries of Europe’s reactive strategy
The warfare in Ukraine uncovered Europe as overly counting on NATO (the US), in addition to being fragmented by way of nationwide defence insurance policies. NATO did certainly reaffirm its position because the cornerstone of collective defence within the transatlantic space, however the issues for Europe are onerous to disregard.
First, there may be the dependency on US management. European NATO members’ mixed defence spending reached €326 billion in 2024, however solely 50% of German army property have been combat-ready, with Germany’s fight readiness really decrease in 2024 than it was in 2022. With out US army, intelligence and logistical assist, Europe’s means to undertaking energy stays severely constrained – a vulnerability additional highlighted by the truth that if an EU member state is attacked, it might take 45 days for “different members to get permission to maneuver gear throughout borders in response”.
Second, there may be power dependence. As just lately as 2021, the EU’s dependency on Russian pure gasoline stood at 45%, successfully inviting Moscow to weaponise its power market. President Trump criticised German in depth reliance on Russian pure gasoline on the 2018 UN Normal Meeting assembly, dramatically noting that “Germany will turn into completely depending on Russian power if it doesn’t instantly change course”. This assertion famously drew laughter and smirks from the German delegation and different diplomats within the room.
Third, there may be institutional fragmentation. The EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass referred to as for a “Speedy Deployment Capability” of 5,000 troops, however this and different commitments is undermined by the general lack of ample cohesion between EU member states, as exemplified by Hungary and Slovakia’s pro-Russia stance.
In brief, sanctions, army help and coverage paperwork have turn into substitutes for the precise medium-to-long time period technique. Russia’s financial system, although affected by sanctions, has tailored by means of partnerships with Iran and China, whereas its army is rebuilding its forces sooner than anticipated.
Classes from the Ukraine warfare
The warfare’s early phases offered some successes but in addition uncovered sobering realities. One of many key classes was that army readiness issues. Finland’s conscription mannequin is extensively recognised as a significant supply of army resilience, with a small peacetime pressure however an unlimited, well-trained reserve that may be quickly mobilised. This stands in distinction to Germany’s skilled military, which has struggled with readiness and lacks a comparable reserve base.
The warfare has additionally demonstrated that unity has limits. EU sanctions require unanimity, however exceptions have been made for a number of international locations. For instance, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hungary negotiated an exemption from the EU’s oil embargo, permitting it to proceed importing Russian oil. Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been additionally included within the exemption.
Lastly, it has proven that hybrid warfare is the brand new norm. Russian cyberattacks on German infrastructure and disinformation campaigns concentrating on French elections require built-in responses past conventional defence. Crucially, the battle has uncovered Europe’s failure to anticipate Russia’s willingness to soak up huge losses for geopolitical goals.
Strategic pathways for a post-war Europe
Europe faces three viable however imperfect choices. The primary choice is doubling down on deterrence. On the plus aspect, this could align with NATO’s strengthened japanese flank strategy and would additionally leverage the US nuclear umbrella. Nevertheless, within the medium time period, it could perpetuate European dependency on American dedication and ignore alternatives for diplomatic off-ramps. The ReArm Europe programme might minimise functionality gaps, but it surely dangers furthering arms-race dynamics.
A second choice is to pursue strategic autonomy. There are constructive indicators for this strategy, as each the EU’s Everlasting Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund promise deeper integration. France and Germany’s push for an EU nuclear deterrent additionally suggests ambition. But there are additionally divergent risk perceptions that would undermine consensus (for instance, Poland’s give attention to Russia in contrast with Spain’s Mediterranean issues). A current report by the European Courtroom of Auditors warns that shifting tanks throughout borders nonetheless takes weeks.
The ultimate choice is selective engagement. This might construct on the rules of the EU’s 2016 World Technique and incorporate “pragmatic cooperation” on problems with shared curiosity, like Arctic governance. It might additionally contain leveraging discontent amongst Russian oligarchs to undermine Putin’s regime. On the draw back, such a method would threat legitimising aggression and lacks public assist in a number of central and japanese European international locations.
Towards a hybrid technique – deterrence with diplomacy
A extra sustainable future strategy would require combining army credibility with instruments of diplomacy. First, there’s a must credibly outline pink traces. Europe, together with the UK and the EU, should make clear responses to a spread of eventualities, together with nuclear threats, steady hybrid assaults in opposition to European establishments and the potential for a Russian army breakthrough in Ukraine. The EU’s planning should incorporate the usage of its Speedy Deployment Capability.
Second, the EU ought to try to compartmentalise cooperation. After the Ukraine warfare ends, the EU ought to have interaction Russia, if and when potential, on points comparable to cybersecurity governance and climate-driven Arctic safety, whereas additionally sustaining its “Ukraine First” coverage.
Third, the EU should outline and defend what Sven Biscop calls the “zone of duty”, particularly “a geographic space across the EU that should stay steady for the EU itself to get pleasure from stability”. The EU should resolve what relationship it desires to supply to the international locations inside that zone and the way it’s going to defend it. The 2023 EU-NATO Joint Declaration calls the connection “complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing”, however Europe should lead relatively than comply with.
Coverage priorities for European leaders
This leaves 4 key coverage priorities for European leaders. The primary is to speed up defence integration by merging nationwide procurement by way of the European Defence Fund and prioritising drone and AI applied sciences. In its newest funding spherical, the European Defence Fund allotted €910 million to 62 initiatives, specializing in drones, autonomous mine-sweeping, AI-driven defence techniques and counter-hypersonic applied sciences.
The second precedence is to undertake certified majority voting (QMV) on sanctions, thereby overriding veto powers that allow Russian leverage. Presently, EU sanctions require unanimity, permitting any member state to dam or dilute measures. The EU treaties already permit for QMV in sure international coverage areas, and there may be rising stress from the European Fee, Parliament and a few member states to develop its use to sanctions.
The third precedence is to launch a “Safety Cohesion Fund” that may redirect a portion of cohesion coverage budgets to safe power grids and cyber defences in frontline states. The European Fee has already recognized defence as a brand new precedence for cohesion coverage, permitting member states to make use of these funds for infrastructure, dual-use items and safety upgrades.
The ultimate precedence is to determine an EU-Russia disaster hotline following the top of the Ukraine warfare. This might mirror the Chilly Warfare-era US-Soviet hotline, which was established to stop misunderstandings and unintentional escalation, offering a direct communications hyperlink between leaders.
Word: This text offers the views of the writer, not the place of EUROPP – European Politics and Coverage or the London Faculty of Economics. Featured picture credit score: European Union
